Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

Morris L. Peters v. Virginia S. Peters : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald N. Boyce; Clayton & Gould; Attorney for Appellant;
LaMar Duncan; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Peters v. Peters, No. 10059 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4487

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE

OFEJlAH E D

AP R1 6 1964
MORRIS L. PETERS,
Plaintiff- Appellant,- ---··c· ~~:-·s~j;·;~;~--c~~~:-u·i~i~-vs-

CaseNo.10059

VIRGINIA S. PETERS,
Defendant- Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal From the Judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court for Weber County
Hon. Parley Norseth
RONALD N. BOYCE
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

»l3 0 1964

.lAW UBRAR~

AND

CLAYTON & GOULD
First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

LAMAR DUNCAN
~ps Petroleum Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Respondent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE............................

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -------···································

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL..................................................

2

ST.\TEMENT OF FACTS----························································

3

ARGUl\IENT -----········--··········-··························································

6

POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT A LUMP SUM IN
LIEU OF ALIMONY. ........................................

6

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT A DIVORCE
FROM THE APPELLANT ON THE BASIS
OF HER COUNTERCLAIM SINCE,
A. THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS

CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE:
B. NO EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED BY RESPONDENT SHOWING THAT APPELLANT'S CONDUCT RESULTED IN EXTREME MENTAL ANGUISH ................... 10
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
PENDING APPEAL SINCE THE TRIAL
COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION. 13
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 14

AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Brandman v. Brandman, 138 A.2d 869 (Pa. 1958) ........................ 12
Carlton v. Carlton, 104 So. 2d 363 {Fla. 1958) .............................. 12
Cast\-. Cast, 1 Utah 128 (1874) ···················································--· 14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS- Continued
Page

Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144 ( 1946) ··---------- 8
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 564, 65 P.2d 642 ( 1937) ------------ 14
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178,256 P.2d 366 (1953) -------- 12
Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 Pac. 335 ( 1926) ---------------------- 13
Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wash. 2d 639, 369 P.2d 516 (1962) ---------- 9
Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961 ( 1948) ---------------- 14
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 ( 1937) ---------------------- 7, 8
Sartain v. Sartain, 389 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1964) ------------------------------ 12
Stefonick v. Stefonick, 167 P.2d 848 (Mont. 1946) ------------------------ 7
Steiger v. Steiger, 4 U.2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 ( 1956) ------------------------ 12
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 U.2d 153, 369 P.2d 923 ( 1962) ______ 10, 13
Suffredini v. Suffredini, 138 A.2d 710 (Conn. 1957) ---------------------- 12

STATUTES CITED
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 73 (a) (b) ------------------------------ 13
Rule 73 (g) ------------------------------------ 13
TEXTS CITED
136 A.L.R. 502 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Foster, Family Law, 1962 Annual Survey of American Law,
pp. 603, 618 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
Nelson, Divorce & Annulment, 2 Ed.: Sec. 12.49 ---------------------------· 14
Sec. 14.23 ---------------------------Sec. 14.24 ------------------···--··-·- 7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l~

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
~lORRIS

L. PETERS,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 10059

\'IRGINIA S. PETERS,
Defendant- Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\IENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant has appealed from a decision of the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, Judge, Second Judicial District,
\\' eber County, denying the appellant's complaint for divorce from the respondent, granting the respondent a divorce on her counterclaim, and awarding the respondent
the sum of $2,500.00, lump sum in lieu of alimony.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On October 28, 1963, the appellant filed a complaint for
diYorce against the respondent in the District Court of
\\'eber County (R-2). On the same day an order to show
cause and temporary restraining order were also issued
and served (R-3, 13, 14). On October 30, 1963, therespondent filed an .\nswer and Counterclaim ( R-4), a motion to \·acate the restraining order ( R-6) and an affidavit
of prejudice (R-7). On November 1, 1963, the appellant
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2
filed his reply to the respondent's counterclaim (R-8).
On November 4, 1963, the case was referred to Judge Norseth's Court (R-9). Judge Norseth allowed the respondent
to remain in the home with the appellant and set a special
hearing on the merits for November 13, 1963 (R-10). On
November 5, 1963, the respondent filed an "amended"
Answer and Counterclaim (R-11). Trial was had on 13
November, 1963 (R-14). On January 3, 1964, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree awarding respondent a divorce and $2,500.00 lump sum in lieu of alimony was
entered by the Court (R-21, 22). The Court also awarded
the appellant real estate "now standing in the joint names
of the parties" (R-22). On January 31, 1964, the appellant filed his notice and designation of record to this
Court (R-31, 32). Thereafter, on February 5, 1964, after
appeal of this case respondent petitioned the trial court for
appeal costs, attorney's fees, and temporary alimony pending appeal (R-33). On February 19, 1964, Judge Norseth
ordered $50.00 per month temporary alimony on appeal
and $300.00 attorney's fees on appeal (R-39).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant asks the Court to reverse the trial court's
decision granting the respondent a divorce on counterclaim
and order the trial court to grant appellant a divorce as
prayed, and additionally and in the alternative, that the
court reverse the trial court's award of a lump sum in lieu of
alimony. Further, appellant seeks an order vacating the
trial court's awards of alimony and attorney's fees pending
appeal.
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3
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant and respondent were married on November 6, 1961 in Preston, Idaho (T-6). At the time of the
instant action, the appellant was age 54 and the respondent,
age 40 (T-93). Both the appellant and respondent had
been married before (T-6, 20). The appellant had the
custody of a young girl, Jacklyn Peters, at the time of his
marriage to respondent. The child had been taken in by
appellant when she was small, but had not been adopted
(T-6). Subsequent to the marriage between appellant and
respondent, both parties adopted J acklyn Peters (T -33).
At the time of this action Miss Peters was 18 years old
(R-59).
Prior to the time of marriage, the parties entered into an
antinuptial agreement ( R-16, etc.) Generally, the agreement gave the appellant the home he then had, which was
under option to purchase for $25,000.00, and provided that
should he sell the property the respondent would waive all
claims to the sale monies (R-16, etc.). Other properties
the appellant brought into the marriage were to be disposed
of in a varied manner. The terms of this disposition are not
material to this appeal.
At the time of marriage between the appellant and respondent, the respondent was working and earning the sum
of $270.00 per month, and was indebted in the sum of about
$1,000.00 after a previous illness (T-9, 10, 74). The respondent's only contribution to the marital property at
marriage was a few items of furniture (T-9, 41). At the
time of trial the respondent was employed at the same place
as at the time of marriage and was earning $325.00 per
month (T-10, 89). The respondent indicated this employment was temporary, but did not explain the basis for her
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conclusion, although she had been employed for some time
prior to the instant action (T-76, 89). No testimony was
given indicating that at the time of suit the respondent was
indebted, or otherwise had substantial obligations of any
kind. Respondent did not testify to any "need" in excess of
her present earning capacity or otherwise show an inability
to provide for herself.
The evidence disclosed at the time of marriage, subject
to the antinuptial agreement, the appellant owned a home
under option of sale for $25,000.00; $4,300.00 in cash on
deposit; a boat; and an automobile and household furnishings ( R-16, etc., T -8). At the time of the instant action, he
was employed by a railroad where he had a gross income of
$10,000.00 per year, and a net income of approximately
$6,000.00 per year (T-44, 51).
The appellant had prior to the instant action filed for
divorce and obtained a default decree, which was thereafter set aside upon mutual agreement (T-8, 38, 78). At
that time, February 1963, the respondent signed over to
appellant all interest in their present home, which had been
purchased with appellant's money and which the Court
awarded appellant (R-37, 39, Exhibit 1, T-16, 22).1
The appellant filed the instant action on October 28,
1963 on the grounds of mental cruelty (R-2). The respondent answered denying the cruelty and counterclaimed
(with "amended" counterclaim) alleging mental and physical distress for one year "last past" (R-4, 11). The respondent alleged facts and made argument in support of
condonation, but the trial court made no finding of condonation (R-21).
1
Contrary to the trial court's decree, the real property was not in joint
names (R-22).
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5
The evidence in support of the appellant's claim for
relief disclosed that the respondent had indicated she
wanted their daughter, Jacklyn, to leave the house ( T -14).
The n·spondent accused the appellant of having sexual relations with their daughter and referred to her as a "whore"
and "bastard kid" (T-15, 24, 28, 29). The respondent had
no use for their daughter (T-42). She objected to the appellant supporting the daughter or spending money for her
education (T-16, 18). The respondent criticized the appellant's activities and purchases such as his car, his eating
and way of life (T-25, 26, 27). She called him "dirty" and
disliked appellant's personal habits (T-26, 27). Further,
the respondent had contacts with her former husband
(T-20). The respondent's attitude towards the appellant
was characterized as cool and indifferent (T-20, 24, 27)
and there was little peace and harmony in the home
(T-24) . Appellant testified respondent told him she didn't
love him and urged him to get a divorce (T -19) .
The respondent contended the appellant had struck her
on one occasion after the instant action was filed ( T -8 7 ) .
That they argued over the appellant's property (T-76)
and that appellant was indifferent to her personal needs
and expenses (T-76). The respondent denied calling Jacklyn Peters a whore and claimed that the appellant had
called respondent such a name (T-80). She further testified she had provided gifts and clothing for their adopted
daughter (T -81 ) . The respondent stated that she had contributed some household items to the marriage. The appellant told respondent her son was unwelcome in the home
after their marriage and as a result, he left (T -90) .
The appellant denied calling respondent names (T -57)
and denied hitting her (T -4 7). No evidence that respondSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ent ever suffered any mental anguish was shown, or that
appellant caused any such anguish.
The only independent evidence, apart for the parties
themselves, was furnished by Jacklyn Peters, 18 years old,
adopted daughter of the parties.
Miss Peters testified that there had been discord and
disharmony between the parties since May, 1963. She indicated the respondent became upset when the appellant
and she were together and that respondent accused Jacklyn
of conspiring against her (T-60, 61). Jacklyn further
stated that the respondent had accused her and appellant
of "sleeping together" and wanting to live as husband and
wife (T -62) . Respondent also accused J acklyn of being
independently promiscuous and objected to money spent on
the child's education, arguing that the child could support
herself (T-62, 65). Jacklyn indicated that originally the
respondent's attitude towards her had been friendly, and
that respondent had made her clothes and bought her some
items (T-71).
Based upon the above evidence, the trial court made the
award of $2,500.00 lump sum in lieu of alimony to respondent, and awarded her a divorce on her counterclaim. The
appellant was awarded the real property that was in fact
in his name. 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT A LUMP SUM IN LIEU OF ALIMONY.

It is submitted that the trial court erred in awarding the
respondent a lump sum in lieu of alimony of $2,500.00. In
2
Although evidence of condonation was introduced, the Court ~ade ~o
such finding against the appellant, but found he had failed to prove h1s claun
(R-22).
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7
~dson, Divorce and Annulment, 2 Ed.,§ 14.23, it is stated:
"I(Pwt·ver, as a rule, although not always, a lump sun;t awar~ s.hould
be made only in those instances where some special eqmties require it or make it advisable ... "

In Stefanick v. Stefanick, 167 P.2d 848 (Mont., 1946),
the ~[ontana Supreme Court recognized the general rule
that ordinarily an award of a lump sum in lieu of alimony
should be avoided. That case is similar to the instant one in
that the parties were married only a relatively short time,
and had prior to marriage entered into a prenuptial agreement. The Court noted with reference to the policy of lump
sum payments:
"'This Court has held on several occasions that it is inadvisable,
except for special reasons and under special circumstances, to
make an award of alimony in gross or in a lump sum.'"

The Court went on to reverse the trial court's determination
in favor of a lump sum award and did so noting:
"While the terms of an award of alimony or support to the wife are
generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,
such discretion must be supported, we think, by evidence as to the
circumstances of the particular case. An award of a lump sum
should be supported by some impelling reason for its necessity or
desirability."

It is submitted that the facts of the instant case demonstrated no necessity or desirability for making the respondent the award of a lump sum in lieu of alimony. The award
of alimony is to be determined primarily, although not exclusin·ly. on the needs of the wife and financial ability of
the husband. Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, 2 Ed.,
~ 1·!.34. In Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265
(1937), this Court noted that fault or cruelty has no place
in making a property award. Consequently, the right of the
respondent to alimony should be dependent upon her needs
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and contribution to the property and accumulations of the
parties. In Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176P.2d 144
( 1946), the Utah court recognized that a lump sum alimony award was not totally improper where there was
some substantial reason for it, relying upon the Pinion case.
In Pinion v. Pinion, supra, this court laid out the tests for
settlements of property which are applicable to alimony.
When the facts of the instant case are examined against
the standards set out in Pinion, it is clear that no alimony
should have been awarded. The court laid down the following standards as determinative of proper awards: ( 1) The
amount and kind of property owned by each of the parties;
( 2) whether the property was acquired before coverture
or accumulated jointly; ( 3) the opportunity and ability of
each to earn money; (4) the financial condition and necessities of the parties; ( 5 ) the health of the parties; (6) the
standard of living of the parties; ( 7) the duration of the
marriage; (8) the wife's economic status as a result of the
marriage, and (9) the parties' age. In the instant case, all
the economic assets of the marriage came from the appellant and were accumulated prior to marriage. The appellant contributed the home, car and what cash he had in the
bank. The respondent contributed only a few items of furniture and entered the marriage heavily in debt. Each were
employed at the time of marriage and were employed at the
time of the instant action. The respondent's income was
better at divorce, being $325.00 per month against $270.00
per month at marriage. At the time of divorce, respondent
was apparently free from debt. No testimony was offered
wherein she indicated any need for alimony or that her income would not adequately meet her needs; nor was any
evidence offered to demonstrate her needs. Respondent's
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spondent was 40 the appellant 54. Appellant had apparently disposed of cash assets other than the proceeds of the
home. Consequently, it cannot but be concluded that there
was any basis for an award of alimony.
In Foster, Family Law, 1962 Annual Survey of American Law, pp. 603,618, it is noted:
"Unfortunately, it is impossible to report that there is any general
trend in recent cases toward a more realistic attitude in support
and alimony awards. On the one hand, employment opportunities
or the earning potential of women are too often ignored, and, on
thr other, courts typically adopt the policy that the wife is entitled
to maintain that standard of living to which she became accustomed during marriage and thus indirectly penalize the husband
for his marital fault. It is not unusual for pseudo-punitive damages
to become involved in the determination of the amount, even
though it requires but little reflection to reach the conclusion that
in matrimonial actions it is all but impossible to allocate fault
with any assurance of accuracy."

The need of courts to free themselves from award concepts unrelated to modern society and needs cannot be
overemphasized. In Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wash. 2d 639,
369 P.2d 516 (1962), the Washington Supreme Court
noted:
"Alimony is not a matter of right. When the wife has the ability
to earn a living, it is not the policy of the law of this state to give
her a perpetual lien on her divorced husband's future income."

By the same token, where the evidence is so overwhelming in demonstrating the lack of need for the instant award,
this Court should not approve the decision of the trial court
which in effect circumvents the parties antinuptial agreements The award was contrary to law and reason and
should be vacated by this Court .
~o evidence was received to show that appellant had assets available to
sathusfy ~e l~p sum award exclusive of the proceeds of Class I property under
e antmupual agreement.
3

•
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT A DIVORCE FROM THE APPELLANT ON THE
BASIS OF HER COUNTERCLAIM SINCE
A. THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS CONTRARY TO
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE;
B. NO EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED BY RESPONDENT
SHOWING THAT APPELLANT'S CONDUCT RESULTED IN EXTREME MENTAL ANGUISH.

A. The trial court ruled that the appellant had failed in
his burden of proof and that the respondent was entitled to
a decree of divorce on her counterclaim. It is submitted the
trial court erred in failing to accord all the testimony the
evidentiary weight to which it was entitled, and in deciding
the case contrary to the only independent evidence corroborating either party.
The evidence favoring the respondent shows that there
were arguments between the respondent and appellant over
property. That according to the respondent, the appellant
had on one occasion referred to her as a "whore" and a
"gold digger." Respondent further testified that the appellant had made her pay her own medical bills. Further, there
was testimony that after filing the divorce on one instance,
the appellant struck the respondent with his open hand.
This was the extent of the respondent's evidence which was
based on her testimony. No independent corroborative evidence was offered to support the contentions. It is admitted
that if no other evidence had been received that this would
be sufficient under the law to allow the respondent a divorce. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P.2d
923 ( 1962). However, in the instant case, the respondent's
testimony was offered on counterclaim and was clearly less
onerous than the testimony of the tribulations suffered by
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the appellant because of respondent's conduct. In addition,
apprllant denied the respondent's assertions.
The testimony of the appellant was to the effect that
the respondent accused him of illicit relations with their
adopted daughter, called the child a whore and bastard
and constantly resented her presence. The respondent disliked the appellant assisting their daughter in her education, and demanded the child support herself. The respondent according to the appellant had shown him very
little affection after he agreed to their previous decree being
vacated. The respondent told the appellant she did not love
him and told him to get a divorce. In addition, she had some
association \vith her ex-husband. She nagged appellant and
complained about his eating, personal habits and accused
him of being a dirty old man. The course of conduct of the
respondent had carried on for several months. 4 The totality
of the appellant's evidence demonstrated a long period of
cruel treatment by respondent far more severe than that
offered in support of respondent's counterclaim.
The only independent corroborative testimony came
from the parties' adopted daughter, Jacklyn. She supported the appellant's testimony. According to Jacklyn,
there had been substantial discord in the home generated
by the respondent. The respondent accused Jacklyn of
sleeping with her father, of wanting to live with him, and of
being generally promiscuous. Further, Jacklyn corroborated her father's testimony that her mother resented her
and resented money being spent on her for school. Thus,
the ovenrhelming weight of testimony supported the appellant's claims. Under such circumstances, the divorce
should have been granted to the appellant, or at least to
sh

'C~mtrary to the Court's finding, it is submitted that the evidence does not
ow IlllSconduct of the appellant over any sustained period.
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both parties. Sartain v. Sartain, 389 P.2d 1023 (Utah
1964). InHendricksv. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 256P.2d
366 ( 1953), this Court commented:
"In view of the fact that neither spouse is accused of the commission of a felony, adultery 5 or any other heinous offense but
the reciprocal claims rest upon various acts and omissions alleged
to constitute cruelty to the other, the trial court would best perform its function in the administration of justice by determining
which party was least at fault, granting a divorce and adjusting
their rights ... " (Emphasis Added)

In Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418
( 1956) , the Court again recognized the rule that the divorce should be granted the party least at fault. Although
the Court therein indicated it would not overturn the award
of the divorce for the wife, the case is distinguishable from
the instant situation since: ( 1) the only independent evidence supports the appellant, ( 2) the appellant's evidence
when compared to the respondent's conclusively shows he
was less at fault and that the respondent's misconduct was
the more severe in time and quality. In Carlton v. Carlton,
104 So. 2d 363 (Fla., 1958), the husband was awarded a
divorce because of nagging, criticizing and kindred com·
plaints by the wife. In Suffredini v. Suffredini, 138 A.2d
710 (Conn., 1957), and Brandman v. Brandman, 138A.2d
869 ( Pa., 1958) , divorces were granted to husbands because of false accusations of adultery and annoying telephone calls by wives. These precedents support the awarding of the divorce to appellant in this case.
B. Additionally, it is submitted the trial court erred in
awarding the respondent the divorce since she offered no
testimony that any of the conduct caused her mental an·
5
Although not alleged by complaint the respondent was alleged to have accused appellant of sexual relations with his daughter which would be adultery.
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guish. In Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P.2d
923 ( 1962), this Court stated:
"To establish mental cruelty, plaintiff must prove that her husband's cruel treatment caused her to suffer great mental distress."

Further, the mental anguish must be proved by substantial and satisfactory evidence. Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah
580, 245 Pac. 335 ( 1926). In this case, although respondent related various events and occurrences, she did not indicate or demonstrate that as a result she was caused to suffer
great mental anguish. Consequently, the divorce was not
properly awarded to her. Hyrup v. Hyrup, supra.
It is submitted that this Court should reverse the trial
court's decree and order the divorce awarded to the appellant.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY
.\~D ATTORNEY'S FEES PENDING APPEAL SINCE THE
TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION.

Subsequent to the notice of appeal having been filed, the
respondent petitioned the trial court and received an award
of temporary alimony and attorney's fees on appeal. It is
submitted that this order of the trial court is void because
the trial court no longer had jurisdiction. Once the notice
of appeal was filed jurisdiction over the case vested in the
Supreme Court, subject only to whatever residual jurisdiction the Rules of Civil Procedure allow the District Courts.
Rule 73 (a) (b), U.R.C.P. The rules do not provide that
orders during appeal, governing the conduct of the parties,
are to be made by the District Court. The District Court
was therefore without jurisdiction to award temporary alimony or attorney's fees after the appeal had been filed. Rule
73(a), U.R.C.P. cf., Rule 73 (g). The petition should have
been directed to the Supreme Court. This Court could, if it
desired, have referred the matter to the District Court for
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evidentiary findings, this then would have conferred jurisdiction on the District Court to that limited extent. Precedent supports the jurisdiction of this Court alone to award
alimony and costs pending appeal. Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah 128
( 1874); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 564,65 P.2d 642
( 1937) ; Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961
( 1948); 136 A.L.R. 502; Nelson, Divorce & Annulment,
§ 12.49.
Since no appeal or petition from the respondent has been
addressed to this Court, Cast v. Cast, supra, no award could
be made nor is there any demonstrated need before this
Court for such relief.
CONCLUSION
The record in this case demonstrates the unfortunate
attitude of courts to treat divorce cases in an off-hand manner. This is supported by the many obvious conflicts between the findings and the evidence. It is clear that no basis
for any alimony or lump sum in lieu thereof was presented
to the trial court sufficient to sustain the decree. Additionally, it is manifest that the weight of evidence required
the appellant be awarded the divorce. He was least at fault,
presented a more compelling case and sustained his burden
by independent corroboration. The Court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
AND

CLAYTON & GOULD
First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant.
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